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(Comiments
CREDIBILITY IPEACHMENT BY PRIOR CONVICTION
The adversary system of adjudication is one of the major cornerstones
of the Anglo-American system of justice. One of the most striking character-
istics of this adversary system is the right of counsel to impeach the credi-
bility of the opponent's witnesses. The purpose of this is to suggest to the
trier of fact that the witness's testimony is not worthy of belief.1 Exposing a
witness's prior convictions of offenses against society is one of the most
commonly used methods of impeachment. Such a practice is specifically
authorized in Missouri by a statute which provides:
Any person who has been convicted of a criminal offense is, not-
withstanding, a competent witness; but the conviction may be
proved to affect his credibility, either by the record or by his own
cross-examination, upon which he must answer any question rele-
vant to that inquiry, and the party cross-examining shall not be
concluded by his answer.2
This method of credibility impeachment is available against any wit-
ness, including a criminal defendant testifying in his own behalf.3 Three
recent Missouri Supreme Court decisions4 reviewed the statute and the
practice of impeachment by prior convictions as applied to criminal de-
fendants. This comment analyzes the impact of the new decisions and de-
scribes the current state of Missouri's limitations on the practice, compares
approaches of other jurisdictions, outlines unresolved constitutional issues
lurking in the background, and discusses the merits of the practice in light
of its underlying policy considerations.
I. CHARACTER EVIDENCE: FRAMEwoRK OF ImPEAcHmENT
By PRIOR CO1IMTIONS
To properly discuss the use of criminal convictions for impeachment
purposes, it is necessary to review their use as substantive evidence of the
defendant's guilt in a criminal case. Evidence of prior convictions is a type
of character evidence,5 which is a category of circumstantial evidence de-
1. C. McCoRflCK, EVIDENCE § 83 (1954).
2. § 491.050, RSMo 1969.
3. State v. Clinton, 67 Mo. 380 (1878), overruled on other grounds, State
v. Williams, 337 Mo. 884, 87 S.W.2d 175 (1935).
4. State v. Morris, 460 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. 1970); State v. Frey, 459 S.W.2d
359 (Mo. 1970); and State v. Scott, 459 S.W.2d 821 (Mo. 1970).
5. Evidence as to what one's character is or was when such is one of the
ultimate issues in the case is also referred to as character evidence and should be
distinguished from that discussed in the text. Examples of this other use of
character evidence include proving the truth of an allegation of bad character in
a libel action, determining the "prior chaste character" of the prosecutrix where
such is an element of statutory rape, and imposing primary negligence on an em-
ployer for entrusting duties to an incompetent or unreliable employee. See C. Mc-
CorAimo, supra note 1, §§ 153-54; 1 J. WiGMzoRE, Evm mcE §§ 70-81 (3d ed. 1940).
(472)
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signed to prove what one's acts or intent probably were.6 The trier of fact
reasons from good or bad character to a general disposition to act or not to
act in a certain manner, and to an inference that the person either did or
did not in fact act in that manner. This reasoning suggests, as do some com-
mentators,7 that evidence of the actor's character will always be relevant to
prove or disprove his alleged acts. Nevertheless, the general rule of the
courts is to exclude character evidence as proof of conduct or intent.8 The
reason for the general exclusion of such otherwise relevant evidence is that
"generally it comes with too much dangerous baggage of prejudice, dis-
traction from the issues, time-consumption and hazard of surprise."9 The
dangers of prejudice are especialy acute when character evidence is sought
to be introduced against a criminal defendant. Courts have long prevented
the prosecution from introducing evidence of the bad character of the ac-
cused, unless and until the defendant first gives evidence of his good char-
acter.10
In the area of character evidence involving prior crimes, however, sev-
eral major exceptions (in addition to impeachment) have been grafted onto
the general rule excluding character evidence. Basically these exceptions
provide for the admission of character evidence if it is substantially relevant
for some purpose other than to show a probability that the accused com-
mitted the crime with which he is charged by reasoning through his being a
man of criminal character." The courts usually require a dose relationship
of some sort between the prior offense and the offense charged.12 Purposes
forming the basis for such an exception tend to fall in the following non-
exhaustive categories:' 8
(1) Res gestae. A defendant's other crimes are admissible to the extent
that they complete the story of the crime on trial by showing its immediate
context.14 For example, in a trial for robbery, the Missouri Supreme Court
6. C. McCoRMcK, supra note 1, § 153. See generally §§ 153, 155-61; 1 J.
WIGMOR., supra note 5, §§ 54-69.
7. E.g., C. McCoamcK, supra note 1, § 155.
8. id.; 1 J. WiGmoR, supra note 5, § 64. Accord, PRop. FE. R. Evm. 404 (a)
(Rev. Draft, 1971).
9. C. McCoRAnczK, supra note 1, § 155. See also 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5,
§ 57. This was the rationale employed by the Missouri Supreme Court in State v.
Hayes, 556 Mo. 1033, 204 S.W.2d 723 (1947).
10. See State v. Withers, 547 S.W.2d 146, 150 (Mo. 1961); State v. Hampton,
275 S.W.2d 356 (Mo. En Banc 1955); State v. Hayes, 356 Mo. 1033, 204 S.W.2d
723 (1947); State v. Willard, 346 Mo. 773, 142 S.W.2d 1046 (1940); State v.
Robinson, 344 Mo. 1094, 150 S.W.2d 530 (1959); State v. Pinkston, 336 Mo. 614,
79 S.W.2d 1046 (1935); State v. Bugg, 316 Mo. 581, 292 S.W. 49 (1927); State
v. Baird, 271 Mo. 9, 195 S.W. 1010 (1917); State v. Wellman, 253 Mo. 302, 161
S.W. 795 (1915); State v. Shipley, 174 Mo. 512, 74 S.W. 612 (1905); State v.
Martin, 74 Mo. 547 (1881); State v. Creson, 38 Mo. 372 (1866). See also C. McCoR-
i zn, supra note 1, § 157; 1 J. WIGMoRo, supra note 5, §§ 55, 57; Hunvald, Criminal
Law in Missouri: Evidence of Other Crimes, 27 Mo. L. Rav. 544, 545 (1962).
11. C. McCoimac, supra note 1, § 157; 1 J. WiGmoRE, supra note 5, §§ 192-94.
Accord, PROP. FED. R. EviD. 404 (b) (Rev. Draft, 1971).
12. Hunvald, supra note 10, at 546.
13. The organization of C. McCoRMIc, supra note 1, § 157 is borrowed.
14. C. McCoRmiCK, supra note 1, § 157.
1971]
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has upheld the admission of evidence that the accused robbed other per-
sons at the same time.15 The court has allowed evidence in a rape prosecu-
tion of a subsequent rape of the prosecutrix and a rape of her sister, when
all three attacks occurred consecutively and as part of the same occurrence.16
Admitting evidence of an act of sodomy by the accused upon the prosecutrix
immediately after the robbery with which he was charged has also been
upheld.17
The court expanded the scope of the res gestae exception in State v.
Adamson.'8 The defendants were on trial for forgery of checks. The prose-
cution was allowed to show that the defendants had illegally printed the
checks, an act committed some time prior to the actual writing of the checks
and therefore arguably not part of the "immediate" context of the crime.
The court reasoned that such other illegal acts should be admitted when it
is impossible to show the elements of the crime charged without showing
their prior events. "The State is not to be penalized if parties so entangle
their illegal affairs that one offense cannot be proved without also proving
others."")
(2) Motive. Evidence of other crimes is admissible to show the motive
of the accused to commit the crime charged.20 Accordingly Missouri has
allowed evidence in a murder prosecution of defendant's relationship with
a married woman to show why the defendant followed her home and fought
with the deceased, a friend of the woman's husband.2' In a prosecution for
homicide in the perpetration of arson, the court approved of the admission
at trial of evidence of defendant's conviction for non-support for the pur-
poses of proving that the defendant wanted it to appear that he died in a
fire.22 Most recently, in a trial for assaulting policemen with intent to kill,
the court approved of admitting evidence of defendant's narcotics sales to
prove that he shot at the officers while attempting to avoid arrest for the
latter offense.28
(3) Intent. Whenever either the general or specific mens rea is an es-
sential element of the crime charged, such intent may be shown by evidence
of other crimes committed at or about the time of the commission of the
offense charged.24 For example, for the purpose of proving intent to de-
fraud, the court approved the admission into evidence in a prosecution for
forgery that defendant uttered another check on the same day.25 In State v.
Varner,26 the court properly admitted evidence of another murder to es-
tablish deliberation, where the bodies were found 40 feet apart.27 However,
15. State v. Ashe, 350 S.W.2d 768 (Mo. 1961).
16. State v. Ward, 337 Mo. 425, 85 S.W.2d 1 (1935).
17. State v. Gentry, 212 S.W.2d 63 (Mo. 1948).
18. 346 S.W.2d 85 (Mo. 1961).
19. Id. at 87. See Hunvald, supra note 10, at 545-46.
20. State v. Hyde, 234 Mo. 200, 136 S.W. 316 (1911); 29 AM. JuR. 2D Evi-
dence § 825 (1967).
21. State v. Fuller, 302 S.W.2d 906, 910 (Mo. 1957).
22. State v. Paglino, 319 S.W.2d 613, 625-26 (Mo. 1958).
23. State v. Jackson, 446 S.W.2d 627 (Mo. 1969).
24. 29 AM. JuL. 2D Evidence § 324 (1967).
25. State v. Garrison, 305 S.W.2d 447, 451 (Mo. 1957).
26. 329 S.W.2d 623 (Mo. 1959).
27. Id. at 628.
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the commission of other criminal acts of the same kind are not admissible
to prove intent where the criminal intent is presumed from the act itself.28
Thus, the court has found error in the admission of evidence of a car theft
in a prosecution for another car theft.2 9
(4) Absence of mistake. Evidence of other crimes is admissible to prove
that the act in issue was not inadvertent, accidental, mistaken or without
guilty knowledge.8 0 In a prosecution for manslaughter, the court approved
admitting evidence of other shootings about the same time to rebut any
inference of accidental or mistaken discharge of the weapon.3 ' Missouri has
similarly allowed evidence that a defendant charged with making and de-
livering an insufficient funds check had drawn another check on the same
bank the same day, 2 evidence as to defendant's prior receipt of stolen goods
under similar circumstances, 83 and evidence of other illegal liquor sales to
rebut defendant's claim that the sales involved in the principal charge
were made by his clerk without his consent.3 4
(5) Common scheme or plan. Evidence of other crimes is admissible to
prove the crime charged when it tends to establish a common scheme, plan,
system or conspiracy embracing the commission of two or more crimes so
related to each other that proof of one tends to prove the other.3 5 For
example, Missouri courts have sanctioned the admission into evidence of a
series of fraudulent real estate transactions to show one continuing scheme
to defraud the prosecutrix,3 6 as well as evidence in an abortion prosecution
of another abortion committed at the same place and about the same time.87
The relative ease of establishing this ground in Missouri is indicated by
State v. Swinburne,88 where the court upheld the admission of acts com-
mitted after the consummation of a rape as showing a "common scheme"
to violate the victim's person.89
(6) "Handiwork of the accused." Professor McCormick asserts that it
is permissible "[t]o prove other like crimes by the accused so nearly identi-
cal in method as to ear-mark them as the handiwork of the accused. ' 40
Missouri has not yet enumerated this type as a separate ground for admis-
sion. However, such a ground is not really needed in Missouri, given the
court's liberal construction of "common scheme or plan."41
28. State v. Barker, 249 S.W. 75 (Mo. 1923); State v. Patterson, 271 Mo. 99,
110, 196 S.W. 3, 6 (1917) (dictum).
29. State v. Barker, 249 S.W. 75, 77 (Mo. 1923).
30. C. McCowrMcK, supra note 1, § 157.
31. State v. Shilkett, 356 Mo. 1081, 204 S.W.2d 920 (1947).
32. State v. Kaufman, 308 S.W.2d 333 (St. L. Mo. App. 1957).
33. State v. Hunt, 280 S.W.2d 37 (Mo. 1955).
34. State v. Stamper, 159 Mo. App. 382, 141 S.W. 432 (K.C. Ct. App. 1911).
35. 29 Am. JurL 2D Evidence § 326 (1967). For two recent applications of
this rule, see State v. Smith, 431 S.W.2d 74 (Mo. 1968), and State v. Burnett, 429
S.W.2d 239 (Mo. 1968).
36. State v. Mandell, 353 Mo. 502, 183 S.W.2d 59 (1944).
37. State v. Scown, 312 S.W.2d 782 (Mo. 1958).
38. 324 S.W.2d 746 (Mo. En Banc 1959).
39. Id. at 753.
40. C. McCoanca, supra note 1, § 157.
41. See text accompanying notes 35-39 supra.
1971]
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 4 [1971], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol36/iss4/3
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
(7) Evidence of prior sex offenses against the same prosecutrix are ad-
missible to show a passion or propensity for illicit sexual relations with that
prosecutrix.4 2 However, unlike the majority of jurisdictions, 43 Missouri
courts restrict this exception to sexual acts committed prior to the offense
charged.44
(8) Identity. Evidence of other crimes is admissible if relevant and
absolutely necessary to prove the identity of the accused.4 5 One Missouri
case suggests that proof of such other crime must naturally tend to show
that the accused is the one who committed the offense on charge.46 Ad-
missible details and circumstances of the other offense are limited to those
which are both relevant and necessary to establishing identity.4 7 Once
identity is established by other evidence, other crimes are not admissible
under this theory.48 Professor McCormick suggests that this ground is best
advanced when accompanied by another theory for admission.4 9
(9) Conduct evidencing a weak cause. Evidence of criminal acts of the
accused are admissable if they constitute admissions by conduct, and are
intended to avoid punishment for the crime on charge.5 0 In State v.
Aitkens5 ' the defendant was charged with killing a 14-month-old infant by
suffocation. The court approved of the admission into evidence of de-
fendant's confession, which included a statement that she had mutilated
the corpse with a knife to make it appear that the child had been the victim
of a criminal attack.5 2 Responding to defendant's claim that this part of the
confession was erroneously admitted because it proved a separate crime,
42. State v. Tyler, 306 S.W.2d 452 (Mo. 1957); State v. Hersh, 296 S.W. 433(Mo. 1927); State v. Cason, 252 S.W. 688, 690 (Mo. 1923); State v. Sechrist, 226
Mo. 574, 126 S.W. 400 (1910); C. McCoRmcn, supra note 1, § 157.
43. The majority rule allows evidence of such other sex crimes regardless
of whether they occurred before or after the crime on trial. See Stewart v. State,
38 Ala. App. 365, 84 So. 2d 658, cert. denied, 264 Ala. 699, 84 So. 2d 660 (1955);
People v. Foster, 117 Cal. App. 439, 4 P.2d 173 (1931); People v. Roberts, 367
Ill. 620, 12 N.E.2d 632 (1937); State v. King, 117 Iowa 484, 91 N.W. "768 (1902);
McCreary v. Commonwealth, 163 Ky. 206, 173 S.W. 351 (1915); Commonwealth
v. Machado, 339 Mass. 713, 162 N.E.2d 71 (1959); State v. McPadden, 150 Minn.
62, 184 N.W. 568 (1921); State v. Peterson, 102 Mont. 495, 59 P.2d 61 (1936);
Smith v. State, 127 Neb. 776, 257 N.W. 59 (1934); Louis v. State, 92 Okla. Grim.
156, 222 P.2d 160 (1950); State v. Hardin, 63 Ore. 305, 127 P. 789 (1912); State
v. Whitener, 228 S.C. 244, 89 S.E.2d 701 (1955); State v. Ballard, 72 S.D. 293, 33
N.W.2d 339 (1948); Walker v. State, 197 Tenn. 452, 273 S.W.2d 707 (1954); State
v. Willett, 78 Vt. 157, 62 A. 48 (1905); Stump v. Commonvealth, 137 Va. 804,
119 S.E. 72 (1923); State v. Crowder, 119 Wash. 450, 205 P. 850 (1922); State
v. Beacraft, 126 W.Va. 895, 30 S.E.2d 541 (1944); Lanphere v. State, 114 Wis.
193, 89 N.W. 128 (1902). See generally Annots., 77 A.L.R.2d 841 (1961), 167
A.L.R. 565 (1947).
44. State v. Amende, 338 Mo. 717, 92 S.W.2d 106 (1936); State v. Guye, 299
Mo. 348, 252 S.W. 955 (1923); State v. Arnold, 267 Mo. 33, 183 S.W. 289 (1916);
State v. Palmberg, 199 Mo. 233, 97 S.W. 566 (1906).
45. See State v. Taylor, 324 S.W.2d 643 (Mo. 1959).
46. State v. Thompson, 280 S.W.2d 838, 842 (Mo. 1955) (dictum).
47. State v. Griffin, 336 S.W.2d 364 (Mo. 1960).
48. State v. Reese, 364 Mo. 1221, 274 S.W.2d 304 (En Banc 1954).
49. C. McCoPmxc, supra note 1, § 157.
50. Id.
51. 352 Mo. 746, 179 S.W.2d 84 (1944).
52. Id. at 752, 179 S.W.2d at 87.
[Vol. 36
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the court said that the proof was admissible "as tending to establish her
identity, guilty knowledge, and absence of mistake or accident, on the same
theory as if she had fled or attempted to conceal or destroy the corpse."53
II. HISTORY OF IMPEACHMNT BY PRIOR CONICIONS5 4
The intricacies of impeachment by prior convictions posed few prob-
lems at common law. No prejudice to the accused was possible, because
the party on trial was himself deemed incompetent and consequently could
never occupy the role of witness.55 The defendant's character itself could not
be attacked unless and until the defense offered evidence of his good char-
acter. 56 Moreover, conviction of an "infamous crime" (i.e., treason, any
other felony, or any misdemeanor involving dishonesty or obstruction of
justice) rendered a person incompetent as a witness. 57 Little is written
about impeachment at common law by convictions for other than "infamous
crimes." Missouri's earliest reported decision involving impeachment by
prior conviction was Deer v. State,58 in which the defendants were allowed
to show at trial that a prosecution witness had been convicted of keeping
a house of prostitution.5 9
Statutory reform of the old common-law rules of incompetency brought
with it the legal problems relating to impeachment which must be dealt
with today. The first step in Missouri was the general assembly's abolition
of the interest disqualification in 1877.60 This statute allowed the accused
to testify as a witness61 in his own behalf and provided that his self-interest
could "be shown for the purpose of affecting his or her credibility."62 The
following year the supreme court significantly expanded the impeachability
of criminal defendants in its landmark decision State v. Clinton.63 The
53. Id. at 756, 179 S.W.2d at 90 (emphasis added). See also People v.
Spaulding, 309 Ill. 292, 141 N.E. 196 (1923).
54. For a more exhaustive treatment of Missouri's history of impeachment,
see Bishop, Impeachment and Rehabilitation of Witness By Character Evidence
in Missouri (pts. I & 2), 20 Mo. L. Rxv. 142, 273 (1955).
55. C. McCo uIcK, EVIDENCE § 65 (1954); 2 J. WIGMORE, EviENxcE §§ 575,
579-80 (3d ed. 1940).
56. Cases cited supra note 10.
57. C. McCoRmicK, supra note 55, §§ 43, 64; 2 J. WMoRE, supra note 55,
§ 520.
58. 14 Mo. 348 (1851).
59. The supreme court upheld the trial court's rejection of the record of
the conviction after the fact of the conviction had already been shown to the
jury by other proof. Id. at 350.
60. Mo. Laws 1877, at 356, § 1.
61. At common law, the accused could plead his case, but he was not sworn
or given "witness" status. See 2 J. WGMoRE, supra note 55, § 575.
62. Mo. Laws 1877, at 356, § 1 provided:
No person shall be rendered incompetent to testify in criminal causes
by reason of being the person on trial or examination; but any such
fact may be shown for the purpose of affecting his or her credibility:
Provided, That no person on trial or examination shall be required to
testify, except as a witness on behalf of the person on trial or examina-
tion ...
63. 67 Mo. 380 (1878), overruled on other grounds, State v. Williams, 337
Mo. 884, 87 S.W.2d 175 (1935).
1971]
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court held that a criminal defendant choosing to make himself a witness
could be impeached, contradicted and subjected to the same tests as any
other witness.64 This judicial extension of the new statute was reflected in
the following year's statutory compilation,6 5 and remains ingrained in
Missouri's present statutory matrix.66 The Clinton doctrine, now backed by
statutory authority, ran counter to the long-established rule prohibiting the
introduction of evidence of defendant's bad character until the defendant
presented evidence of his good character.67 It has been held that the defend-
ant must offer himself as a witness before he is subject to impeachment,68
but that his introduction of evidence of his good character need not be a
prerequisite to impeachment.6 9 The conflict between the two lines of author-
ity has never been thoroughly resolved in this state.70
In 1895 the general assembly removed the common-law incompetency of
persons convicted of infamous crimes.7 ' The statute provided, though, that
such prior convictions could be shown to affect the witness's credibility. Con-
sequently, the evidentiary reform brought with it a host of new problems,
some of which persist to the present day.
III. CamEs WHICH CAN BE UsED FOR IMPEACHmEN
A. Approaches
One of the main problems posed by statutorily authorized impeach-
ment by evidence of prior conviction is determining which convictions may
be used for that purpose. The problem in the United States has been de-
cided in almost as many ways as there are states. For the most part, the
various rules can be grouped into the seven categories which follow.
1. Common-law Infamous Crimes
"Infamous crimes" at common law included treason, other felonies,
and misdemeanors involving dishonesty or the obstruction of justice.72
64. Id. at 391.
65. The portion of the 1877 act quoted in note 62 supra became part of
1918, RSMo 1879. This statute differed from the 1877 act by making minor
changes in wording and by allowing contradiction and impeacement in the same
manner as for any other witness.
The text of § 1918, RSMo 1879, is as follows:
No person shall be incompetent to testify in any criminal cause or
prosecution by reason of being the person on trial or examination; ...[deleted portions relate to husband-wife privilege] but any such facts
may be shown for the purpose of affecting the credibility of such
witness; provided, That no person on trial or examination, nor wife
or husband of such person, shall be required to testify, but any such
person may, at the option of the defendant, testify in his behalf, or on
behalf of a codefendant, and shall be liable to crossexamination, as to
any matter referred to in his examination in chief, and may be con-
tradicted and impeached as any other witness in the case...
66. § 546.260, RSMo 1969, is identical to § 1918, RSMo 1879, except for minor
changes in punctuation.
67. Cases cited note 10 supra.
68. State v. Wellman, 253 Mo. 302, 161 S.W. 795 (1913).
69. State v. Hulbert, 299 Mo. 572, 253 S.W. 764 (1923).
70. Bishop, supra note 54, at 157.
71. Mo. Laws 1895 § 1, at 284 [the ancestor of § 491.050, RSMo 1969, and
identical to it].
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These crimes formerly rendered a witness incompetent.73 Consequently,
when states passed statutes giving such witnesses competency,74 allowing
impeachment by the formerly incapacitating crimes was a logical step. In-
deed, this was the earliest interpretation of the statute by Missouri courts.75
Impeachment by infamous crimes is the approach followed today in Illi-
noiS, 76 where the legislature has avoided potential problems in determining
whether a conviction is "infamous" by enumerating such crimes specific-
alyj7
2. Felonies Only
This approach is administered easily, since most jurisdictions specify
by statute what constitutes a felony.7 8 However, such an approach would
allow impeachment of credibility by culpably negligent manslaughter,7 9
such as a death arising out of a traffic accident, but would exclude impeach-
ment by an attempt to improperly influence a juror.8 0 Nevertheless, the
"felonies only" approach has wide acceptance, including Arizona,81 Iowa,8 2
Nebraska 8  and the federal courts of the eighth circuit.8 4
8. Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude
This approach appears to be more consistent with the purpose of
credibility impeachment, as it limits impeachment to those crimes displaying
reprehensible character traits. However, a great deal of uncertainty plagues
the determination of what constitutes a "crime involving moral turpitude."
It has been defined as
An act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social
duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general,
73. Authorities cited note 72 supra.'
74. E.g., § 491.050, RSMo 1969.
75. See State v. Donnelly, 130 Mo. 642, 32 S.W. 1124 (1895); State v. Warren,
57 Mo. App. 502 (K.C. Ct. App. 1894).
76. See People v. Kirkpatrick, 413 IM. 595, 110 N.E.2d 519 (1953); Barthol-
omew v. People, 104 Ill. 601 (1882).
77. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 124-1 (1967) provides:
"Infamous crimes" are the offenses of arson, bigamy, bribery, burglary,
deviant sexual assault, forgery, incest or aggravated incest, indecent lib-
erties with a child, kidnapping or aggravated kidnapping, murder,
perjury, rape, robbery, sale of narcotic drugs, subordination of perjury,
and theft if the punishment imposed is imprisonment in the penitentiary.
78. E.g., § 556.020, RSMo 1969, provides:
The term "felony," when used in this or any other statute, shall be
construed to mean any offense for which the offender, on conviction,
is liable by law to be punished with death or imprisonment in a correc-
tional institution of the state department of corrections, and no other.
79. § 559.140, RSMo 1969, declares such a crime to be punishable by as
much as ten years in the penitentiary.
80. § 557.130, RSMo 1969, declares such a crime to be a misdemeanor.
81. See State v. Mangrum, 98 Ariz. 279, 403 P.2d 925 (1965).
82. See IOWA CODE § 622.17 (1966).
83. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1214 (1943); Coxbill v. State, 115 Neb. 634,
214 N.W. 256 (1927).
84. See Montgomery v. United States, 403 F.2d 605 (8th Cir. 1968) (affirm-
ing a decision from the western district of Missouri); Whitfield v. United States,
376 F.2d 5 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 883 (1967).
1971]
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contrary to the accepted rule of right and duty between man and
man.85
The difficulty in administering such a rule can be inferred from the
vagueness of the court's definition, and the rule has been the subject of
criticism.8 6 Nevertheless, South Carolina,8 7 Tennessee,88 Texas89 and
federal courts in the sixth circuit90 have adopted this approach.
4. Crimes Involving Dishonesty or False Statement
This rule was originally promulgated by the American Law Institute
in its Model Code of Evidence91 and was subsequently recommended by the
Missouri Bar in its Proposed Missouri Evidence Code92 and by the state
commissioners in the Uniform Rules of Evidence.98 However, neither was
ever enacted by the Missouri Legislature. Kansas has adopted this approach
by statute,94 and the Kentucky Court of Appeals recently adopted a modi-
fication of it.9 5 It has the advantage of admitting only those prior convic-
tions which bear a relation to the witness's likelihood to tell the truth.
5. Any Crime
This "wide-open" approach to impeachment avoids the difficulty in
administration inherent in some of the foregoing rules. As will be discussed
later, it also is subject to the most abuse.06 The "any crime" approach en-
joys great popularity with state courts. Missouri,97 Oklahoma,9 8 Arkansas,99
Ohio 00 and New Jersey010 are among the states which follow this rule.
85. Brooks v. State, 187 Tenn. 67, 76, 213 S.W.2d 7, 11 (1948), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 837 (1950), quoting 2 Bouvm's LAw DiarIONARY (Rawles rev. ed. 1914).
86. See Comment, Impeachment of Witnesses in Tennessee, 36 TENN. L.
REv. 728, 737-38 (1969).
87. See Gantt v. Columbia Coca Cola Co., 204 S.C. 374, 29 S.E.2d 488 (1941).
88. See Davis v. Wicker, 206 Tenn. 403, 333 S.W.2d 921 (1960); McGee
v. State, 206 Tenn. 230, 332 S.W.2d 507 (1960).
89. See Nutter v. Dearing, 400 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
90. See United States v. Griffin, 378 F.2d 445 (6th Cir. 1967); United States
v. Jackson, 344 F.2d 922 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 880 (1965).
91. MODEL CODE OF EvImNcE rule 106 (1942).
92. Mo. Bar, Proposed Missouri Evidence Code § 5.10 (a) (4-5) (1948), quoted
note 241 infra.
93. UiFoni RUL OF EvmENcz 21 (1953).
94. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-421 (1963). Kansas statutorily adopted the Uniform
Rules in their entirety. Thus, this statute, identical to UNiFoRM RULE OF EvIDENCE
21 (1953), takes the protection of the criminal defendant a step further by exclud-
ing impeachment by any conviction until he has first introduced evidence in
support of his credibility. See pt. VII, § B of this comment.
95. The new Kentucky rule restricts impeachment to felonies involving dis-
honesty or false statement. See Cotton v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.2d 698, 701(Ky. 1970), noted in 59 Ky. L.J. 514 (1971).
96. See pts. V & VI of this comment.
97. Cases are discussed in detail in pt. H, §§ B &c C of this comment.
98. See Martin v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 340, 285 P.2d 959 (1951); Hathcox
v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 110, 230 P.2d 927 (1951); Coslow v. State, 83 Okla. Crim.
378, 177 P.2d 518 (1947).
99. See Johnson v. State, 370 S.W.2d 610 (Ark. 1963); Lytle v. State, 163
Ark. 129, 259 S.W. 394 (1924); Hollingsworth v. State, 53 Ark. 387, 14 S.W. 41
(1890).
100. See State v. Carter, 150 Ohio App. 545, 53 N.E.2d 794 (1944).
101. See State v. Cioffe, 122 N.J.L. 342, 26 A-2d 57 (1942).
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6. Trial-court Discretion.10 2
This view requires the trial judge to balance the impeaching convic-
tion's relevancy against (1) the prejudice against the accused and (2) the
probable effect of such evidence on the accused's election to testify. It has
been adopted in the District of Columbia 0 3 on the basis of a statute10 4 sub-
stantially the same as the Missouri statute. 0 5 Two other federal circuits
have now followed the lead of the District of Columbia in adhering to this
approach1oS Although New Mexico has adopted a similar rule,107 trial-
court discretion has not generally been well received by state courts.'0 8
The Missouri Supreme Court was given the opportunity to adopt this
rule last year. The defendant in State v. Morris'0 9 contended that section
491.050, RSMo 1969 allowed a court to admit prior convictions for in-
peachment purposes, but did not require such admission."10 The District of
Columbia statute"' and Missouri's section 491.050 both provide that prior
convictions "may" be used to affect credibility. The District of Columbia
Court of Appeals had said:
Section 305 is not written in mandatory terms. It says, in effect,
that the conviction "may," as opposed to "shall," be admitted; and
we think the choice of words in this instance is significant. The
trial court is not required to allow impeachment by prior convic-
tion every time a defendant takes the stand in his own defense. The
statute, in our view, leaves room for the operation of a sound ju-
102. For a discussion of this approach by the judge writing the landmark
opinion adopting it, see McGowan, Impeachment of Criminal Defendants by Prior
Convictions, 1970 LAN%, & Soc. ORDER 1. See also pt. VII, § A of this comment;
Comment, Impeachment of the Defendant-Witness By Prior Convictions, 12 ST.
L.U.L.J. 277, 283-86 (1967); Notes, Constitutional Problems Inherent in the Ad-
missibility of Prior Record Conviction Evidence for the Purpose of Impeaching
the Credibility of the Defendant-Witness, 37 U. Cm. L. R.v. 168, 182-83 (1968),
Impeaching the Accused by Prior Crimes-A New Approach to an Old Problem,
19 HASTINGS L.J. 919 (1968).
103. See Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965). For clarifying
guidelines, written by now Chief Justice Burger, see Gordon v. United States,
383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968).
104. D.C. CODE ANN § 14-305 (1966).
105. § 491.050, RSMo 1969.
106. See United States v. Perea, 413 F.2d 65 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 945 (1970). United States v. Hildreth, 387 F.2d 328, 329 (4th Cir. 1967).
107. See State v. Coca, 80 N.M. 95, 451 P.2d 999 (Ct. App. 1969). The court
reasoned from prior New Mexico cases and did not cite Luck.
108. Recent cases rejecting the approach include People v. Gilmore, 118 Inl.
App. 2d 100, 254 N.E.2d 590 (1969); State v. West, 285 Minn. 188, 173 N.W.2d
468 (1969); State v. Morris, 460 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. 1970); and State v. Hawthorne,
49 N.J. 130, 228 A.2d 682 (1967).
109. 460 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. 1970).
110. Id. at 627.
111. D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-305 provides:
A person is not incompetent to testify . .. by reason of his having been
convicted of crime. The fact of conviction may be given in evidence to
affect his credibility as a witess ....
1971]
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 4 [1971], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol36/iss4/3
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
dicial discretion to play upon the circumstances as they unfold
in a particular case. 112
Defendant Morris urged that admission of prior convictions which were
not logically related to the probability of untruthfullness or to defendant's
credibility as a witness constituted an abuse of the "discretion" provided in
section 491.050.113 However, the court rejected this argument, concluding
that the statute conferred "an absolute right to show prior convictions solely
to affect credibility." 1 4 The court insisted that any change should be left
to the legislature."15
7. Federal Approach
Federal courts in at least three circuits"16 combine two of the above
approaches. They allow impeachment only by felonies and those misde-
meanors involving dishonesty or false statement. While the preliminary
draft of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence adopted the same rule,"17
the revised draft of 1971 added the limitations of a third approach-an
overall restriction of "trial court discretion.""18
B. Crimes Usable for Impeachment in Missouri
Early Missouri cases subscribed to the "infamous crimes" approach." 9
However, in 1903 the supreme court seized on the words "convicted of a
criminal offense" in the 1895 act 2 0 and held that those words constituted a
legislative mandate to allow impeachment by any criminal offense, including
misdemeanors.' 2 ' What weight is to be given to such evidence of impeach-
ment is to be determined by the jury. 2 2 This rule has been followed even
though the conviction used for impeachment is for the same crime as the
one on trial, 2 8 and when the crime forming the basis of the impeaching
conviction arose out of the same conduct as the civil cause of action on trial.
For example, Fischer v. Gunn 2 4 was a civil suit arising out of an auto-
112. Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763, 767-68 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
113. State v. Morris, 460 S.W.2d 624, 627 (Mo. 1970).
114. Id. at 629.
115. Id.
116. See United States v. Sanders, 412 F.2d 854, 855 (5th Cir. 1969); United
States v. Remco, 388 F.2d 783 (3d Cir. 1968); United States v. Provoo, 215 F.2d
531 (2d Cir. 1954); United States v. Montgomery, 126 F.2d 151, 155 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 316 U.S. 681 (1942).
117. PROP. FED. R. EVID. 6-09 (a) (Prelim. Draft, 1969).
118. PROP. FED. R. EviD. 609 (a) (Rev. Draft, 1971), quoted note 250 infra.
119. See State v. Donnelly, 130 Mo. 642, 32 S.W. 1124 (1895); State v. Warren,
57 Mo. App. 502 (K.C. Ct. App. 1894).
120. Mo. Laws 1895 § 1, at 284 [now § 491.050, RSMo 1969].
121. State v. Blitz, 171 Mo. 530, 71 S.W. 1027 (1903).
122. State v. Ransom, 340 Mo. 165, 174, 100 S.W.2d 294, 298 (1936).
123. State v. Hunt, 352 S.W.2d 57 (K.C. Mo. App. 1961), examined critically
in Hunvald, Criminal Law in Missouri: Evidence of Other Crimes, 27 Mo. L. Rv.
544, 547-52 (1962).
124. 270 S.W.2d 869 (Mo. 1954).
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mobile accident. When the defendant took the stand his credibility was im-
peached by a traffic violation arising out of the same accident. 125
C. Limitations to the Missouri Rule
Missouri has narrowed its "any crime" rule somewhat by construing
strictly the statutory requirements of "conviction" and "criminal offense."' 26
In State v. Frey12 7 the prosecutor asked the defendant, accused of illegal
sale of narcotics, if he had ever been convicted of a narcotics charge before.
When the defendant replied that he had not, the prosecutor was allowed to
introduce the record of prior proceedings in another circuit court showing
that defendant had pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of narcotics, and
that the court had suspended the imposition of sentence and had placed
the defendant on two year's probation.128 The supreme court held that the
prior proceedings, notwithstanding the plea of guilty, did not constitute a
"conviction" within the meaning of section 491.050, and that the intro-
duction of the record of the prior proceedings constituted reversible er-
ror.12 9 The court based its decision on prior Missouri dictum8 0 and cases
in accord from other jurisdictions.a13 The court, though, ignored Missouri
cases suggesting the contrary, 32 as well as contrary holdings in other juris-
dictions.SS
It is dear that mere arrests'3 4 or indictments 35 cannot be the basis of
inquiry. The court has also ruled that there can be no impeachment by a
conviction void on its face' 36 or by the record of a conviction pending on
appeal. 3 7 Moreover, violations of municipal ordinances 3 8 and adjudica-
125. Id. at 876-77. But see State v. Tannell, 296 S.W. 423 (Mo. 1927) (a
criminal action where the court found that allowing cross-examination of the
accused as to another crime arising out of the same circumstances as the crime
for which he is tried is error).
126. § 491.050, RSMo 1969.
127. 459 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1970).
128. Id. at 360.
129. Id. at 862.
130. State v. Blevins, 425 S.W.2d 155 (Mo. 1968); State v. Rumfelt, 258 S.W.2d
619, 620 (Mo. 1958); Neibling v. Terry, 852 Mo. 896, 899, 177 S.W.2d 502, 504
(En Banc 1944); State v. Townley, 147 Mo. 205, 208, 48 S.W. 888, (1898);
Meyer v. Missouri Real Estate Comm'n, 288 Mo. App. 476, 482, 188 S.W.2d 842,
845 (1944).
181. Commonwealth v. Finkelstein, 191 Pa. Super. 828, 156 A.2d 888 (1959);
City of Boston v. Santosuosso, 807 Mass. 802, 80 N.E.2d 278 (1940).
182. State v. Rose, 825 S.W.2d 485 (Mo. 1959), and State v. Merrell, 268 S.W.
118 (Mo. 1924), suggest strongly, but do not explicitly state, that a plea of guilty
constitutes a conviction. The state offered these cases, but the court did not
mention them at all in the opinion. See Brief for Respondent at 12-14, State v.
Frey, 459 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1970).
188. E.g., State v. Reyes, 99 Ariz. 257, 408 P.2d 400 (1965); People v. Ward,
184 Cal. 801, 66 P. 872 (1901); People v. Andrae, 295 Ill. 445, 129 N.E. 178 (1920).
184. State v. Howard, 102 Mo. 142, 14 S.W. 937 (1890).
185. Holden v. Berberich, 851 Mo. 995, 174 S.W.2d 791 (1948).
186. State v. Wagner, 237 S.W. 750 (Mo. 1922).
187. State v. Blevins, 425 S.W.2d 155 (Mo. 1968). The Proposed Federal
Rules restrict this exclusion to annullments or pardons given pursuant to a pro-
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tions of juvenile delinquency 3 9 do not constitute "criminal offenses" for
impeachment purposes. Failure to constitute a prior conviction may pre-
clude such matters from being used for impeachment, since a line of cases
beginning in 1865140 provides that, while a witness may be impeached by
inquiry into particular acts of misconduct for which he has not been con-
victed, counsel is bound by his answer.141
In addition, the trial judge may, within his discretion,142 exclude other-
wise proper convictions if they are "so remote as not to bear reasonably on
the present character of the witness."'1 43 The stated reason for this limitation
is to allow for the possibility that the witness may have reformed.' 44 The
decision of the trial judge will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion.14 5
This wide latitude which the trial judge has been granted has led to un-
certainty on when an impeaching conviction becomes too remote. Missouri
courts have approved impeachment by a 35-year-old conviction, 140 and dis-
approved impeachment by evidence of a ten-year-old crime.147 The court
has intimated that convictions which are otherwise too remote may never-
theless be admitted once the inference of reformation has been rebutted by
defendant's admission of subsequent offenses.' 48 Missouri has relatively
strict standards of remoteness with regard to the admission of prior-crimes
evidence within other exceptions to the general rule excluding character
evidence. 49 For example, in a trial for obtaining money by false pretenses,
a showing that defendant had engaged in similar dealings within 14 months
cedure requiring a "substantial showing of rehabilitation" or based on innocence.
PROP. FED. R. EVID. 609 (c) (Rev. Draft, 1971).
138. Commerford v. Kreitler, 462 S.W.2d 726, 733 (Mo. 1971) (dictum); Willis
v. Wabash R.R., 284 S.W.2d 503 (Mo. 1955); State v. Taylor, 98 Mo. 240, 11
S.W. 570 (1889).
Oklahoma purports to follow the same rule. However, convictions of ordinance
violations have been allowed for impeachment purposes when the violation also
constitutes an offense under state law. LeBlanc v. State, 95 Okla. Crim. 280, 245
P.2d 134 (1952).
139. State ex rel. Shartel v. Trimble, 838 Mo. 888, 68 S.W.2d 87 (1933). The
Proposed Federal Rules would allow discretionary admission of juvenile adjudica-
tions for the impeachment of a witness other than the accused if the adjudication
involved dishonesty or false statement or would have been punishable by one
year or more imprisonment if the witness had been tried as an adult and if the
evidence is deemed necessary to the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the accused. PROP. FED. R. EVID. 609(d) (Rev. Draft, 1971).
140. State v. White, 35 Mo. 500 (1865).
141. Such misconduct may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. State v. Perkins,
342 Mo. 560, 116 S.W.2d 80 (1938). This rule and its exceptions in Missouri
are analyzed by Bishop, Impeachment and Rehabilitation of Witnesses by Character
Evidence in Missomi, 20 Mo. L. REv. 142, 166-72 (1955).
142. State v. Long, 201 Mo. 664, 675, 100 S.W. 587, 590 (1907).
143. Page v. Payne, 293 Mo. 600, 620, 240 S.W. 156, 162 (1922). Contra, Illi-
nois, where remoteness of the conviction has no effect on admissibility. People
v. Brown, 69 Ill. App. 2d 212, 215 N.E.2d 812 (1966); People v. Buford, 396 Ii.
158, 71 N.E.2d 340 (1947).
144. Collins v. Leahy, 102 S.W.2d 801, 811 (St. L. Mo. App. 1937).
145. State v. Long, 201 Mo. 664, 100 S.W. 587 (1907).
146. Jackson v. City of Malden, 72 S.W.2d 850, 855 (Spr. Mo. App. 1934).
147. Page v. Payne, 293 Mo. 600, 240 S.W. 156 (1922).
148. Collins v. Leahy, 102 S.W.2d 801, 811 (St. L. Mo. App. 1937).
149. See pt. 1 of this comment.
[Vol. 36
13
Barnhar: Barnhar: Credibility Impeachment
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1971
COMMENTS
of the offense on trial was deemed by the court to be too remote to be ad-
mitted for the purpose of showing intent. 50 However, such strict standards
have not been applied to the admission of prior convictions for the purpose
of impeachment. The Proposed Federal Rules offer a simpler approach,
specifying an arbitrary ten-year time limit for impeaching convictions.' 5'
IV. CIRCUMSTANUCE INQUIRY
Once it has been determined that a particular prior conviction may be
inquired into for the purpose of impeachment, the court must determine
what aspects of that conviction may be the subject of inquiry. In the recent
case of State v. Scott,152 the accused admitted prior burglary convictions on
direct examination. Then on cross examination, the prosecutor was allowed
to inquire into the details of those prior convictions. Defendant's responses
to the prosecutor's detailed inquiries revealed that the burglaries involved
the theft of adding machines, that he had achieved entry by breaking win-
dow panes in the door, and that the burglaries had taken place in a particu-
lar neighborhood. 153 Defendant was being tried for a burglary in that same
neighborhood, in which entry was achieved by breaking a window pane in
the door and in which an adding machine was stolen.154 The prior con-
victions were dearly too remote to show habit, design or criminal intent.' 55
The court examined section 491.050156 and concluded that the statute
"merely provides that if there is a denial of the prior conviction, the state
is not precluded from showing that in fact the witness had been convicted
previously."' 57 The court held that allowing the prosecutor's inquiries into
the circumstances of defendant's prior convictions constituted prejudicial
error which was not corrected by the limiting instruction.1 58 The rationale
of the decision was that impeachment evidence should not be designed to
provide evidence of guilt.159 Implicit in this rationale is the idea that in-
quiry into the circumstances is improper because of the prejudicial impact
on the jury.
Earlier Missouri decisions had expanded the use that could be made
of prior convictions. In State v. McBride'60 the court stated that it was
proper to show the jury of what crime the witness had been convicted in
addition to the mere fact of prior conviction.16 ' Later decisions extended the
150. State v. Stegall, 353 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Mo. 1962).
151. PROP. FE. R. EvD. 609 (b) (Rev. Draft, 1971).
152. 459 S.W.2d 321 (Mo. 1970).
153. Id. at 322-23.
154. Id. at 322.
155. Id. at 324, citing State v. Stegall, 353 S.W.2d 656 (Mo. 1962).
156. § 491.050, RSMo 1969 is quoted in the text accompanying note 2 supra.
157. 459 S.W.2d at 323 (emphasis added).
158. Id. at 324.
159. Id. Judge Morgan thus based the decision on a broad ground. The
rationale argued by the appellant, that such extra facts regarding the prior
convictions are inadmissible because they are irrelevant (Brief for Appellant at
18, 21-22, 28, State v. Scott, 459 S.W.2d 321 (Mo. 1970)), would have been a nar-
rower ground which might have provided subsequent opportunity for the court
to distinguish this decision on its facts and water down the prohibition.
160. 231 S.W. 592 (Mo. 1921).
161. Id. at 594.
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permissible inquiry to the nature of the crime and the punishment.1 2
However, implicit in the language of these latter decisions was the idea that
no further inquiry would be permitted.16 3 One possible roadblock to the
Scott decision was dictum in State v. Holloway'6 4 suggesting that where a
defendant has testified as to previous convictions of other felonies on direct
examination, eliciting more details about those convictions is within the
permissible scope of cross-examination. However, the case cited by the
court in Holloway as authority for this proposition 6ts did not support the
stated principle, and Holloway has never been followed on this poinL166
Another line of cases' 67 supports the principle that once the witness
admits a particular crime, even the record of his prior conviction is in-
admissible because the statute' 68 allows the showing of the conviction by
cross examination or by the record but not by both. However, the authority
on which this line of cases rests is unreliable. 169
Finally in State v. Mobley17O the court, dealing with improper in-
ferences from prior convictions made by the prosecutor in dosing argument,
stated the principle that prosecutors should not "convey the idea of guilt
162. State v. Washington, 383 S.W.2d 518, 523 (Mo. 1964); State v. Hood,
313 S.W.2d 661, 663-64 (Mo. 1958). Presumably, "punishment" refers to the
sentence adjudged rather than the amount of the sentence actually served.
163. E.g., in State v. Hood, 313 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. 1958), the cross-examination
elicited answers as to the specific crime convicted of, its general nature, and
the punishment. The court stated that the trial court had "complied literally
with the statute and properly limited the examination of each of the witnesses on
that score in the manner heretofore approved by this court." Id. at 664 (emphasis
added).
164. 355 Mo. 217, 195 S.W.2d 662 (1946).
165. State v. Couch, 341 Mo. 1239, 111 S.W.2d 147 (1937).
166. The state did not even cite Holloway. Brief for Respondent, State v.
Scott, 459 S.W.2d 321 (Mo. 1970).
167. Hoover v. Denton, 335 S.W.2d 46 (Mo. 1960); Stack v. General Baking
Co., 283 Mo. 396, 223 S.W. 89 (1920); State v. Sovern, 225 Mo. 580, 125 S.W. 769(1910); Myles v. Saint Louis Pub. Sery. Co., 52 S.W.2d 595 (St. L. Mo. App. 1932).
168. § 491.050, RSMo 1969.
169. In State v. Sovern, 225 Mo. 580, 125 S.W. 769 (1910), the court held
that proof of an impeaching offense must be by evidence sufficient to establish
the fact that the witness had been convicted. In dictum describing such competent
evidence, the opinion noted that the statute (currently § 491.050, RSMo 1969)
"makes the suggestion that the inquiry be made of the witness, and that if the
witness should deny it, the opposing party could resort to proof by the record."
Id. at 591, 125 S.W. at 773. In Stack v. General Baking Co., 283 Mo. 396, 223
S.W. 89 (1920), the court seized on the words "if the witness should deny it"
in the Sovern opinion, and held the record of a prior conviction was properly
excluded after the witness had admitted the conviction. Id. at 418-19, 223 S.W.
at 96. Dictum to the same effect appeared in Myles v. Saint Louis Pub. Serv. Co.,
52 S.W.2d 595 (St. L. Mo. App. 1932). Finally, in Hoover v. Denton, 335 S.W.2d
46 (Mo. 1960), the court purported to hold that once a witness admits a par-
ticular crime, the record of that crime is inadmissible. However, the thrust of
the decision was that the record is admissible if the witness evades the question,
equivocates, or denies the conviction. Id. at 48. Consequently, Hoover is probably
mere dictum in spite of the court's use of the word "hold."
170. 369 S.W.2d 576 (Mo. 1963).
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by reason of the prior offenses." 17'1 This reasoning was applied by the court
in deciding Scott.1 72
The Scott holding puts Missouri officially in line with the overwhelm-
ing weight of authority. 7 Most states, like Missouri, allow inquiry into the
crime for which the defendant has been previously convicted, the nature of
the crime, and its punishment.1 74 A minority of states, however, allow show-
ing only the fact that the witness has been convicted of a crime, and pro-
hibit further inquiry, even into the name of the crime for which the witness
was convicted.17 5 The rationale behind the minority decisions is that the
mere fact of conviction affects credibility; therefore, any further details
contribute nothing to impeachment, while providing the jury with the raw
material for prejudicial inferences. 176
Cases allowing an inquiry into the circumstances of prior convictions
are infrequent. The Texas courts allow the prosecutor to ask about par-
ticular circumstances when the witness requests more specific information
about the crime to which the prosecutor referred.177 A New Jersey case,
reasoning from the fact that a prior conviction may be shown by the record
of conviction, allows a prosecutor to inquire about any details which the
record of conviction would tell the jury if it were introduced. 7 8 However,
there appear to be no reported cases still in effect in any American jurisdic-
tion which purport to allow inquiry into the circumstances of prior con-
victions after the witness has admitted them. 7 9
171. Id. at 581.
172. 459 S.W.2d at 324.
173. Latikos v. State, 17 Ala. App. 655, 88 So. 47 (1921); People v. Braun, 14
Cal.2d 1, 92 P.2d 402 (1939); Watts v. State, 160 Fla. 268, 34 So. 2d 429 (1948);
State v. Perkins, 248 La. 293, 178 So. 2d 255 (1965) (dictum); Lamoureux v. New
York, N.H. &c H. R.R. 169 Mass. 338, 47 N.E. 1009 (1897); State v. Norgaard,
272 Minn. 48, 136 N.W.2d 628 (1965) (dictum); Walker v. State, 151 Miss. 862,
119 So. 796 (1929); State v. Coloff, 125 Mont. 31, 231 P.2d 343 (1951); Vander-
pool v. State, 115 Neb. 94, 211 N.W. 605 (1926); State v. Mount, 73 N.J.L. 582,
64 A. 124 (1906); State v. Conwell, 36 N.M. 253, 13 P.2d 554 (1932); People v.
Moore, 248 N.Y.S.2d 739 (App. Div. 1964); Maranda v. State, 17 Ohio App. 479
(1923); Hendricks v. State, 162 Tenn. 563, 39 S.W.2d 580 (1931); Preather v.
State, 113 Tex. Grim. 167, 18 S.W.2d 649 (1931); State v. Kazda, 14 Utah 2d
266, 382 P.2d 407 (1963) (dictum).
174. C. MCCORMCK, EVIIENCE § 43 (1954).
175. Watts v. State, 160 Fla. 268, 34 So.2d 429 (1948); Norton v. Common-
wealth, 196 Ky. 90, 244 S.W. 310 (1922); Vanderpool v. State, 115 Neb. 94, 211
N.W. 605 (1926); Rice v. State, 191 Wis. 181, 217 N.W. 697 (1928).
176. E.g., Watts v. State, 160 Fla. 268, 34 So.2d 429 (1948).
177. See Hulbert v. State, 97 Tex. Grim. 186, 260 S.W. 575 (1924).
178. State v. Rodia, 132 N.J.L. 199, 39 A.2d 484 (Ct. Err. & App. 1944) (Court
upheld a question asking if the witness had been convicted of atrocious assault
and battery "by cutting").
179. The state did not argue this point in Scott. Its argument can be sum-
marized as follows: (1) failure to preserve points for appeal; (2) attempts to
distinguish appellant's cases as not dealing with details inquired into in the course
of laying the foundation for asking defendant whether he had committed the
prior burglaries, as not governing where the defendant replied that he didn't
remember, or as dealing with more serious circumstance inquiries than the case
at bar; and (3) any error committed was curable by instruction. Brief for Re-
spondent, State v. Scott, 459 S.W.2d 321 (Mo. 1970).
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Like many other areas of the law in recent years, impeachment of the
criminal defendant with his prior convictions is coming under constitutional
attack.18 0 Three basic constitutional issues appear to be involved: (1)
prejudice as a violation of one's right to trial by an impartial jury; (2)
deterrence from testifying as a violation of one's implied "right to testify"
in his own behalf; and (8) the use for impeachment purposes of convictions
not relevant to veracity as a violation of equal protection.
A. Prejudice Vis-a-vis the Impartial Jury
The basic thrust of the first constitutional challenge is that evidence
of the defendant's prior convictions tends to lighten the jury's sense of
responsibility through the inference that, as a "criminal," he is not worthy
of any painstaking consideration.' 8 ' The sixth amendment provides, in part,
that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a...
trial, by an impartial jury of the State... ,"182 Cases involving undue in-
fluence of mass media on juries'8 3 have established the proposition that a
court procedure which "involves such a probability that prejudice will re-
sult.., is deemed inherently lacking in due process. . . ."184 It has been
argued that this proposition is applicable to improper prejudice of the
jury by way of impeachment by prior convictions. 185
Aside from the merits of the constitutional law, a well-known empirical
study by Professors Kalven and Zeise1186 lends support to the suggestion
that the accused is in fact prejudiced by being impeached by his prior con-
victions. Defendants were divided into two dasses. One group consisted
of defendants whose criminal records were either known or suspected. The
second group consisted of those who either had no record or whom the
jury had no reason to believe had a record. The strength of evidence for
both groups was held constant. The acquittal rate for the defendants with
records was 38 percent, compared to 65 percent for the "clean" defendants.' 8 7
180. See generally Note, Constitutional Problems Inherent in the Admissi-
bility of Prior Record Conviction Evidence for the Purpose of Impeaching the
Credibility of the Defendant-Witness, 37 U. Cn'. L. REV. 168 (1968).
181. Cohen, Impeachment of a Defendant-Witness by Prior Conviction, 6
Cur. L. BULL. 26, 87-38 (1970); Comment, Impeachment of the Defendant-Witness
By Prior Convictions, 12 ST. L.U.L.J. 277, 278-79 (1967); Note, supra note 180, at
173-78. For a judicial recognition of this problem, see Stephens v. State, 252
Ala. 183, 186, 40 So. 2d 90, 93 (1949).
182. U.S. CONsT. amend VI.
183. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 881 U.S.
532 (1965); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
184. Estes v. Texas, 881 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1965).
185. Note, supra note 180, at 174:
The principal problem as to prior record convictions is analogous to the
mass medi cases in that the procedures used in both situations are
prejudicial to the defendant's right to a trial by an impartial jury....
[T]he strong policy considerations that the courts must prevent prejudice
which subverts impartiality of the jury should be applicable to the prin-
cipal problem.
186. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMRwnucA JuRY (1966).
187. Id. at 160.
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For a time it appeared as though this constitutional challenge might
succeed. In 1963 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
decided Lane v. Warden, 88 stating that reading the defendant's prior nar-
cotics violations into the record "destroyed the impartiality of the jury and
denied him due process of law."'1 9 The high hopes of reformers were dashed
to the ground in 1967, when the United States Supreme Court rejected the
reasoning of Lane v. Warden in its decision in Spencer v. Texas. °9 0 The
Court brushed aside the Kalven and Zeisel study, claiming that any preju-
dice would be curable by the limiting instructions.' 91
The Spencer decision has been severely criticized, 92 especially the
Court's unqualified support of the limiting instruction as a prejudice-
alleviating device.' 93 Much of the criticism appears logically sound, and
this constitutional challenge may ultimately succeed. However, Spencer has
to be viewed realistically as a setback, and the recent trend of Supreme Court
decisions do not suggest a likelihood that the challenge will succeed in the
next few years. 194
B. Deprivation of "Right to Testify"
The second constitutional challenge deals with the "chilling effect ' 95
of prior convictions on the accused. This occurs when the accused fears the
prejudice emanating from disclosure of his criminal record so much that
he elects not to testify. Empirical documentation lends support to the
existence of this "chilling effect."'19 For example, defendants with criminal
records refused to testify in 26 percent of all the cases studied in the Kalven
and Zeisel project, compared to only nine percent of the defendants without
records. 9 7
188. 320 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1963).
189. Id. at 187.
190. 385 U.S. 554 (1967). Like Lane, this case involved habitual criminal
procedures rather than impeachment. Nevertheless, the reasoning is applicable.
191. Id. at 565. In Montgomery v. United States, 403 F.2d 605 (8th Cir. 1968),
the deprivation of impartial jury argument was rejected, affirming a decision by
the western district of Missouri.
192. See, e.g., Note, supra note 180, at 176-78.
193. Id. at 171; see Spector, Impeachment Through Past Convictions: A Timefor Reform, 18 DFPAurL L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1968); Notes, The Limiting Instruction-
Its Effectiveness and Effect, 51 MINN. L. Rxv. 264 (1966); Other Crimes Evidence
at Trial: Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70 YAL.E L.J. 763, 777 (1961).
The limiting instruction has also received a great deal of criticism from
the bench. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968); Krulewitch
v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring); Nash v. United
States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932) (opinion by Judge Learned Hand).
194. E.g., the Court recently decided that confessions which are constitutionally
infirm under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), may nevertheless be used
for impeachment purposes. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
195. Spector, supra note 193, at 7; Note, Impeaching the Accused by His
Prior Crimes-A New Approach to an Old Problem, 19 HAsTMNGs L.J. 919, 924
(1968).
196. See H. KALVEN &c H. ZElsE-L, supra note 186, at 146, 160-61; J. FRAu,
NOT GuiLTY 106-07 (1957); E. BoRcHARu, CONVIGMrG mM INNocEr 188, 232,
365-66 (1942).
197. H. KALvWN 8 H. ZxsEL, supra note 186, at 146. The study also found
a strong positive correlation between the existence of a prior record and the
unvillingness of the defendant to testify. Id. at 160-61.
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The thrust of the constitutional challenge is that the "chilling effect"
deprives the accused of his "right to testify." One proponent argues:
This privilege [against self-incrimination] allows the defendant
to remain silent if his testimony would incriminate him. The cor-
relative privilege is that the defendant can testify without subject-
ing himself to incrimination when remaining silent would preju-
dice him. The right is abridged for a defendant with a criminal
record because he cannot testify without having his criminal record
introduced into evidence, which consequently incriminates him.198
There are cases which suggest that depriving an accused of his right to
testify is a procedural due process violation.199 However, applying these
decisions to a criminal defendant whose fear of prejudice from his criminal
record kept him from testifying is a big step which the courts have not yet
chosen to take.
C. Deprivation of Equal Protection
The thrust of the third constitutional challenge is that whenever the
prior convictions used for impeachment have no logical relationship to the
veracity of the defendant-witness, such impeachment constitutes invidious
discrimination between a defendant with a prior record and a defendant
who has none, in violation of the equal protection dause2 00 of the four-
teenth amendment.2 01 The equal protection cases have made it dear that
a state cannot discriminate between persons without a reasonable basis for
such discrimination.2 02 It is argued that a defendant with a criminal record
is discriminated against in favor of a similar defendant without a record
because the former suffers prejudice from impeachment which the latter
does not.2 08 Where such impeachment is pursuant to a statute allowing
impeachment by convictions of crimes whose commission was unrelated
to the veracity of the defendant as witness, 20 4 there is arguably no reason-
able connection between the purpose of the law (credibility impeachment)
and the discriminating effects.
The chances that this argument will prevail are poor. The consti-
tutionality of impeachment with "infamous crimes" has been explicitly
upheld by an Illinois tribunal.2 05 One predominant interpretation of the
equal protection clause is that its sole purpose was to protect the newly
freed slaves from discrimination.2 06 Under this interpretation a criminal
198. Note, supra note 180, at 179.
199. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948); Morgan v. United States,
304 U.S. 1 (1938); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116 (1934); Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 391 (1898);
Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409, 417-19 (1897).
200. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1 provides: "[N]or shall any State ... deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
201. Cohen, supra note 181, at 37; Note, supra note 180, at 179-80.
202. See Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 465 (1957); Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12, 17 (1956).
203. Note, supra note 180, at 180.
204. E.g., § 491.050, RSMo 1969.
205. See People v. Robbins, 88 Ill. App. 2d 447, 232 N.E.2d 302 (1967).
206. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
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defendant has no standing to raise the equal protection argument. More-
over, the Court's approach toward non-racial equal protection cases for the
past generation has been to uphold statutes if the legislature may have had
any reasonable basis for its passage.20 7 Finally, the Court's treatment of the
prejudicial effects of jury knowledge of prior convictions in Spencer v.
Texas208 suggests that one may have a difficult time getting the Court to
recognize that a defendant is thereby prejudiced. One commentator sug-
gests that "while the process of impeachment under discussion has many
defects, it is doubtful if it is unconstitutional. It is probably merely an
outmoded and archaic method of conducting a trial."209
VI. POuCY CONSIDERATIONS
The underlying policy behind the exclusion of character evidence in
general, and evidence of other crimes in particular, is to protect the ac-
cused from unfair prejudice.2 10 Impeachment is an exception 11 through
which evidence of the defendant's prior crimes is allowed.2 12 The policy
for allowing these convictions to be disclosed to the jury is to enable the
jurors to determine whether to believe what the defendant, as a witness,
says. A frequently quoted New Hampshire opinion explains:
No sufficient reason appears why the jury should not be informed
what sort of person is asking them to take his word. In transactions
of everyday life, this is probably the first thing they'd wish to
know.213
Mr. Justice Holmes, when sitting with the high court in Massachusetts,
pointed out the reasoning involved in such impeachment:
When it is proved that a witness has been convicted of a crime,
the only ground for disbelieving him which such proof affords is
the general readiness to do evil which the conviction may be sup-
posed to show. It is from that general disposition alone that thejury is asked to infer a readiness to lie in the particular case, and
thence that he has lied in fact. The evidence has no tendency to
prove that he was mistaken, but only that he has perjured himself,
207. See Dandridge v. Williams, 897 U.S. 471 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland,
866 U.S. 420 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 848 U.S. 488 (1955); Daniel
v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949); Railway Express Agency,
Inc., v. New York, 886 U.S. 106 (1949).
208. 885 U.S. 554 (1967). See pt. V, § A of this comment.
209. Spector, supra note 198, at 5 n.15.
210. C. McConaucx, supra note 174, § 157. The Missouri Supreme Court has
stated two grounds for excluding evidence of other crimes:
[f]irst, the impropriety of inferring from the commission of one crime that
the defendant is guilty of another; and, second, the constitutional objec-
tion to compelling a defendant to meet charges of which the indictment
gives no information.
State v. Hyde, 284 Mo. 200, 224, 136 S.W. 816, 322 (1910).
211. C. McCoRMicy, supra note 174, § 157.
212. "Thus, with a wave of the evidentiary wand, what previously was too
prejudicial to be heard by the jury becomes reliable valid evidence." Comment,
supra note 181, at 278.
213. State v. Duke, 100 N.H. 292, 293, 128 A.2d 745, 746 (1956).
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and it reaches that conclusion solely through the general proposi-
tion that he is of bad character and unworthy of credit.214
This policy has been criticized as unsound. For example, one commentator
complains of the irrationality of asking the jury to determine credibility
on the basis of a single incident rather than on a course of conduct. 215
Another critic asserts that the impeachment process fails to recognize the
absence of a reasonable connection between criminal convictions in gen-
eral and the witness' tendency to testify truthfully.2 16
Two other strong policy considerations cut against the use of prior
convictions for impeachment purposes. The more significant consideration
is the danger of prejudice to the accused.2 17 Professor McCormick's opinion
of the problem is representative of the views of most textwriters. He states:
If the accused is forced to admit that he has a 'record' of past con-
victions, particularly if they are crimes similar to the one on trial,
the danger is obvious that the jury, despite instructions, will give
more heed to the past convictions as evidence that the accused is
the kind of man who would commit the crime on charge, or even
that he ought to be put away without too much concern for present
guilt, than they will to its legitimate bearing on credibility.218
Another commentator has isolated two separate variants of this prejudice:
(1) a juror's tendency to brand the defendant as one who, regardless of
his guilt or innocence for the present offense, should be locked up for the
other crimes which he has in fact committed and been convicted of, and
(2) the logical, but improper, inference that since the accused has com-
mitted other crimes, he probably committed the present one.219 As has
been pointed out,220 the Kalven and Zeisel study lends empirical evidence
of the existence of this kind of prejudice.221
In addition, the defendant cannot escape prejudice altogether by re-
fusing to testify, for this forebearance arguably has a prejudicial impact of
its own. Defendant's silence is often interpreted by the jury to mean that
he has something to hide, especially when the defendant is in a position to
add testimony that no one else is able to give.222 Furthermore, an indirect
form of prejudice results from what has been called the "associational
effect.' 228 This is the risk that prejudice against a witness due to his police
214. Gertz v. Fitchburg R., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884).
215. Spector, supra note 193, at 22.
216. Note, supra note 180, at 170.
217. Some examples of prejudice were discussed in pt. V of this comment.
218. C. McCoaIca, supra note 174, § 43; see also 1 J. WiGMoRE, Evm NcE § 57
(3d ed. 1940).
219. Cohen, supra note 181, at 33.
220. See pt. V of this comment.
221. H. KALVEN & H. ZmEsEL, supra note 186, at 160. See text accompanying
note 186 supra.
222. 2 ABA-ALI Tr. MANUAL FOR THE DrFENSE OF CRUMINAL CASES 390(Amsterdam, Segal, Miller, rptrs. 1967); C. McCoRwcn, supra note 174, § 43;
Spector, supra note 193, at 7. See also Brown v. United States, 370 F.2d 242, 245
(D.C. Cir. 1966).
223. Spector, supra note 193, at 7.
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record will be transferred to the party for whom he testifies. Although it
can harm any party to litigation, the associational effect is especially preju-
dicial to the criminal defendant, who may be associated in jurors' minds
with his witnesses as "another criminal." 224 If, as has been suggested, there
is an actual likelihood that a criminal defendant will have witnesses with
criminal records,22 5 the magnitude and frequency of such associational
prejudice is alarming.
Moreover, the occurrence of prejudice by the use of prior convictions
for impeachment purposes encourages abuse of that procedure. Evidence
which discloses that the defendant has committed crimes besides the one
for which he is being tried has been called an area "where an eager prosecutor
can follow a course of conduct designed to lead the jury to decide cases
on the basis of emotion rather than reason." 22 6 'Such abuse is said to be
tactically wise because of a juror's inability to follow limiting instruc-
tions.2 27 The cases reflect the grim fact that such abuse by prosecutors, and
even attorneys in civil litigation, is frequent.22 8 Thus, if evidence of other
crimes is generally excluded in order to protect the accused from unfair
prejudice,22 9 the impeachment exception undermines the rule by letting all
of the proscribed evils in through the back door.
Of course, a high degree of prejudice in a given case can give rise
to a second major policy consideration. One should ask in every case: "Does
the danger of unfair prejudice against the witness and the party calling
him outweigh the probable value of the light shed on credibility?" 230 If
the prejudice outweighs the value, there is a real question as to whether
the evidence should be excluded altogether.2 31
VII. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. Trial Court Discretion
Professor McCormick has suggested that courts stop determining the
admissibility of evidence of other crimes by "pigeon-holing" the cases into
the appropriate exceptions to the exclusionary rule. Instead he suggests
that the trial judge in his discretion determine admissibility with a balanc-
ing test. On one side the judge considers (1) the need for such evidence
in light of the issues and the other evidence available to the prosecution,
(2) the strength of the proof that the accused did in fact commit the other
crimes, and (8) the strength or weakness of the other crimes evidence in
supporting the issue. Against this he weighs the prejudicial impact of the
224. Id. at 8.
225. Id. at 7-8.
226. Hunvald, Criminal Law in Missouri: Evidence of Other Crimes, 27 Mo.
L. REv. 544 (1962).
227. Hoffiman & Brodley, Jurors on Trial, 17 Mo. L. R.v. 285, 245 (1952) (an
empirical study of jury behavior).
228. See State v. Hunt, 352 S.W.2d 57 (K.C. Mo. App. 1961), where the court
tacitly approved of a flagrantly abusive impeachment. The decision is critically
analyzed by Hunvald, supra note 226, at 547-52.
229. C. McCoaRsca, Evmz.cu § 157 (1954).
230. Id. § 41.
231. Id. §§ 151-52.
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evidence on the jury.28 2 This approach is, in effect, the approach of the
District of Columbia courts after Luck v. United States.238
However, there are disadvantages to this approach. The author of the
Luck opinion has pointed out three major faults.2 84 First, the rule produces
a new chance for delay "at a time when expedition in the clearing of the
criminal docket is of critical importance." 23 5 Second, it has drastically in-
creased the number of criminal appeals, thereby increasing the strain in
relations between trial and appellate courts.236 Finally, the approach solves
none of the problems regarding what crimes are appropriate for impeach-
ment.237 This last criticism would appear to be the most significant. Indeed,
the first two might be regarded as logical results of the third. The trial
judge needs a firm standard on which he, as well as the prosecution, the
defense and parties to civil litigation, can dependably rely with respect to
whether a witness can be impeached by a given conviction. Impeachment
is, after all, merely collateral to the substantive issues on trial. The elaborate
balancing process adopted by the District of Columbia circuit 238 seems
inappropriate when a simple rule could do the job.
B. Immunization of Criminal Defendant
from All Impeachment by Prior Conviction
Another possibility is a flat ban on impeaching a criminal defendant
with prior convictions. 28 9 A modification of this approach was recom-
mended by the ALI Model Code,240 the Proposed Missouri Code241 and
232. Id. § 157.
233. 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Cf. PRoP. FED. R. Evm. 609 (a) (Rev. Draft,
1971), quoted note 250 infra. See pt. III, § B of this comment.
234. McGowan, Impeachment of Criminal Defendants by Prior Convictions,




238. Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Luck v. United
States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
239. See Comment, Impeachment of the Defendant-Witness By Prior Con-
victions, 12 ST. L.U.L.J. 277, 286 (1967).
240. MODEL CODE OF EvrDENcE rule 106 (1942).
241. Mo. Bar, Proposed Missouri Evidence Code § 5.10 (a)(4-5) (1948) pro-
vides:
4. No evidence concerning his [i.e., a criminal defendant as witness]
conviction of other crimes shall be elicited on cross-examination, or other-
wise introduced, for the sole purpose of impairing the credibility of an
accused person on trial who elects to testify but who does not introduce
any evidence for the sole purpose of supporting his credibility as a
witness. If an accused person on trial introduces evidence for the sole pur-
pose of supporting his credibility as a witness, he shall be subject to
examination and extrinsic evidence may be introduced, as is the case
with respect to other witnesses, with respect to his convictions of crimes
involving untruthfulness or false statement.
5. The conviction of a witness of a criminal offense involving untruth-
fulness or false statement, when competent evidence, may be proved
by the record or by his own cross-examination, upon which the witness
must answer any question relevant to that inquiry, and the party cross-
examining shall not be concluded by the answers of the witness.
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the Uniform Rules,2 42 and has been adopted by the legislature in Kan-
sas.243 This modified approach allows no impeachment of a defendant-
witness by his prior convictions unless he has first introduced evidence solely
for the purpose of supporting his credibility.244 A rule nearly as sweeping
has been in effect in England for nearly three-quarters of a century. The
Criminal Evidence Act 245 excludes evidence of any crime other than the
one charged except (1) when relevant toward proof of the pending charge,
(2) when the defense has sought to prove either the good character of the
defendant or the bad character of prosecution witnesses, or (8) when the
accused has testified against a co-defendant.2 4 6 Certainly any of these ap-
proaches would alleviate the prejudice now facing a defendant impeached
by his prior record. Indeed, even the author of the Luck opinion has indi-
cated that he now favors such an approach over trial-court discretion.2 47
But such immunization of a criminal defendant protects him at the ex-
pense of depriving the jury of knowing "what sort of person is asking them
to take his word." 248 The approach allows the defendant with a record
to appear, perhaps wrongfully, as a man of credible character, and deny a
valuable argument to the defendant-witness who has no record. 249 It would
appear that such an approach goes too far.
C. The Proposed Federal Rules
The revised draft of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence250 sug-
gests a complicated compromise approach. Basically the rule would allow
impeachment by any felony and by misdemeanors involving dishonesty or
false statement, subject to an overall "trial court discretion" limitation.251
This rule is a step forward, because it excludes most misdemeanors and
the evils which attend their admission.252 The only misdemeanors admis-
242. UNn rom RULE op EVIDENcE 21 (1953).
243. KA.. STAT. ANN. § 60421 (1964).
244. A defendant-witness who has introduced evidence in support of his
credibility, as well as other witnesses generally, are impeachable only by crimes
involving dishonesty or false statement.
245. Can'nNA EviDENCE Acr, 61 & 62 Vict., c. 36 (1898).
246. Id. § 1 ().
247. McGowan, supra note 234, at 12.
248. State v. Duke, 100 N.H. 292, 293, 123 A.2d 745, 746 (1956).
249. Plop. FED. R. Evm. 6-09 (a), Adv. Comm. Note (Prelim. Draft, 1969).
250. PROP. FED. R. Evm. 609 (a) (Rev. Draft, 1971) provides:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that
he has been convicted of a crime, except on a plea of nolo contendere,
is admissible but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or im-
prisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was con-
victed or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the
punishment, unless (3), in either case, the judge determines that the
probative value of the evidence of the crime is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice.
251. Id. The overall "trial court discretion" limitation appeared in the Pro-
posed Rules for the first time in the 1971 revised draft. Cf. PROP. FED. R_ Evm. 6-09
(Prelim. Draft, 1969) and the criticism of "trial court discretion" in the Advisory
Committee notes.
252. See pt. III, § B of this comment.
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sible for impeachment purposes will be those having probative value re-
garding credibility. In addition, the discretion limitation may alleviate
some of the prejudice problems which accompany impeachment by any
felony.253 However, this protection depends solely on the discretion of the
trial judge and is by no means guaranteed. An unsympathetic district judge
could open the door to prejudice, leaving the injured party with only a faint
hope for reversal due to abuse of discretion. Finally, as suggested earlier,25 4
desired guidelines for admissibility are lacking.
D. Limitation to Crimes Involving
Dishonesty or False Statement
Another solution borrows a common thread from each of the two
previous solutions. When one strips the "all felonies" proviso and the
"discretion" limitation from the Proposed Federal Rules25 5 and the gen-
eral immunity of the criminal defendant from impeachment by any prior
crimes from the Kansas statute,256 the Uniform Rules, 2 57 the Proposed Mis-
souri Evidence Code258 and the ALI Model Code,259 the remainder con-
sists of a rule permitting any witness to be subject to impeachment by his
prior convictions; but only by those crimes, whether felony or misdemeanor,
involving dishonesty or false statement. Such an approach would eliminate
much of the prejudice inherent in most other approaches, including Mis-
souri's "any crime" rule.260 At the same time, it would allow the jury to
know about prior convictions in the very instances when they would sub-
stantially illuminate the witness's credibility. Credibility consists basically
of whether the witness should be believed; convictions involving dis-
honesty or false statement have high probative value in that regard. It is
submitted that any prejudice emanating from the jury's knowledge of such
convictions is outweighed by the magnitude of their probative value.
The advisory comment to the preliminary draft of the Proposed Fed-
eral Rules dismissed this approach summarily, asserting that "[m]ost
crimes regarded as having a substantial impeaching effect would be ex-
cluded."261 The committee did not bother to specify any particular crime
fitting its description. One might surmise that murder would be such a
crime. However, the jurors should not really be concerned with whether
a witness is a murderer; they should be concerned as to whether the witness
253. An example of such prejudice is a driver in a fatal highway accident
who is convicted of culpably negligent manslaughter. He could be impeached by
that conviction under an "any felony" approach, ostensibly even in a subsequent
tort action arising out of the same accident. Such impeachment would tell the
civil jurors that another trier of fact thought the driver was culpably negligent
beyond a reasonable doubt. Yet, what does such a conviction really add to the
determination of the driver's credibility as a witness?
254. See pt. VII, § A of this comment.
255. PROP. FED. R. Evm. 609 a (Rev. Draft, 1971).
256. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-421 (1964).
257. UNIFORM RuLz oF EvIDEN E 21 (1953).
258. Mo. Bar, Proposed Missouri Evidence Code § 5.10 (a) (4-5) (1948).
259. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 106 (1942).
260. See pts. III & VI of this comment.
261. PRoP. FED. R. Evm. 6-09 (a), Adv. Comm. Note (Prelim. Draft, 1969).
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is telling them the truth. Does the fact that a witness has committed a
murder make it that unlikely that he would tell the truth? It is submitted
that any logical probative value is substantially out-weighed by prejudice,
either directly to the defendant as witness, or by association with the party
for whom the witness testifies.
One possible problem lies in getting this approach enacted. It has been
observed that "statutes loom large as an impediment to progress. In the
main they do not make this classification of permissible crimes, and the
courts are loath to depart from the classification provided for by the legis-
lature."2 62 The Missouri statute263 refers only to "criminal offenses" with-
out classification, and 68 years of interpretation2 64 is not likely to be over-
turned.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Missouri and most other American jurisdictions currently allow a
witness, including a criminal defendant testifying in his own behalf, to
be impeached by prior convictions in a manner which may prejudice the
proponent of the testimony without necessarily shedding significant light
on the credibility of the witness. The policy reasons behind such practices
would seem to be outweighed by policy considerations against them. Even
the constitutional base of current practices appears to be on uneasy foot-
ing, although their immediate demise is not foreseeable. What is needed
is a process which will protect the criminal defendant, or indeed any party
to litigation, from the unfair prejudice resulting from the introduction of
one's prior crimes, while still allowing the jurors to "be informed what
sort of person is asking them to take his word."2 65 Limiting prior-conviction
impeachment to those crimes involving dishonesty or false statement appears
to satisfy that goal. In view of Missouri's entrenched case law, the legisla-
ture should be urged to amend section 491.050 to effect the desired change.
One scholar has observed that such statutory reform has little chance be-
cause no interest group has a stake in it.266 Therefore, it is incumbent upon
members of the bar to make known their concern for such reform.
In addition, Missouri would do well to clarify when a prior conviction
becomes too remote for impeachment purposes. The ten-year time limit of
Proposed Federal Rule 609 (b)2 67 would seem to be a reasonable solution
and worthy of adoption in this state. A judicial decision to that effect would
seem to fit within section 491.050. Moreover, if the legislature could be
persuaded to amend that section to reflect the "dishonesty or false state-
ment" reform, it might also include in the amendment the ten-year limit
in Rule 609 (b) of the Proposed Federal Rules.
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